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Military Operations

Objective Force Maneuver Units of Action

Summary. This new pamphlet serves as the basis for developing doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) focused requirements and solutions for Maneuver Units of Action (UAs). Under this concept, UA capabilities are projected across the future battlespace to conduct military operations to fight and win across the spectrum of military operations.

Applicability. This pamphlet applies to all U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Department of Army (DA) activities that develop DOTMLPF requirements. Active Army, Army National Guard, Army Reserve operating forces, and Army Materiel Command may use this pamphlet to identify future trends in the Army.

Suggested improvements. The proponent of this pamphlet is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine, Concepts and Strategy (DCSDCS). Send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) through channels to Commander, TRADOC, ATTN: ATDO-C, 10 Whistler Lane, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-1046. Suggested improvements may also be submitted using DA Form 1045 (Army Ideas for Excellence Program (AIEP) Proposal).

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1-1. Purpose. This is the new operational concept for tactical warfighting. It is about exposing the enemy by combat action, setting conditions, and destroying them in close combat. The concept is capabilities and threat-based to compensate for the capabilities of expected threats on the highly ambiguous, complex, and dynamic battlefield of the future. Objective Force Units of Action will be designed for success in any type of operation while optimized for major theater war. They will require a new framework of action enabled by advanced

technologies, executed by well-trained, disciplined, determined soldiers and leaders marked by mental agility and rapid tactical decision making. They will be adaptive and self aware—able to master the transitions in the diversity of 21st Century military operations.

1-2. References. Required and related publications are listed in appendix A.

1-3. Explanation of abbreviations and terms. Abbreviations and special terms used in this pamphlet are explained in the glossary.

Chapter 2

Overview

2-1. Objective Force Unit of Action.

a. Ultimately, all Objective Force decisive operations are based on tactical success in close combat, the ability of the Unit of Action (UA) to seize and control key terrain, and to close with and destroy enemy forces. Close combat has one purpose—the defeat or destruction of enemy forces to decisively resolve the outcome of battles and engagements.

b. At entry, Objective Force tactical units will be immediately capable of conducting simultaneous, distributed, and continuous combined arms operations, day and night, in open, close, complex, and all other terrain or weather conditions throughout the battlespace. Tactical units will incorporate organic combined arms at the lowest tactical levels to maximize versatility, agility, and improve capabilities for the close fight.

c. Units of Action will *see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively* on the tactical battlefield. This leap-ahead operational capability, enabled by advanced technologies, is a completely new paradigm of how tactical units will fight and win; and how they will train to fight and win across the spectrum of military operations. Close tactical combat will be revolutionary by the synergy of maneuver, firepower, protection and leadership, empowered by dominant situational understanding resident in a vibrant information network.

d. These breakthroughs will provide tactical units the strategic responsiveness, deployability, agility, versatility, lethality, survivability, and sustainability qualities needed to sustain full spectrum dominance. It will also provide the versatility to change patterns of operation faster than the enemy can respond, and the agility to adjust to enemy changes of operation faster than they can exploit them.

e. Therefore, the final hallmark of the Objective Force will be its soldiers. At the heart of the Objective Force are soldiers and leaders—Warriors—who will go into harm's way to impose our Nation's will on any adversary. Into their hands, we will put the world's finest warfighting technology. They must be expert at the use of emerging technologies and will be trained for the full range of operations. They will have the moral determination to kill our enemies as readily as they are willing to help alleviate the suffering of innocents.

2-2. Echelonment.

a. Echelonment in the Objective Force is a complex question that demands extensive analysis

and experimentation. TRADOC has not yet defined all levels of command resident within the Objective Force.

b. To discuss echelonment, Objective Force concepts employ a functional framework in which **Units of Employment** perform tasks assigned today to divisions and higher service headquarters. They link ground and joint forces and orchestrate ground operations that decide joint campaigns. They also have the capacity to assume command of Joint Task Forces. Units of Employment are the basis of combined arms air-ground task forces. They resource and execute combat operations; designate objectives; coordinate with multiservice, interagency, multinational, and nongovernmental activities; and employ long range fires, aviation and sustainment; while providing command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and tactical direction to UAs.

c. **Units of Action** are the tactical warfighting echelons of the Objective Force. For analytic purposes, UAs comprise those echelons brigade and below. Maneuver UAs are the smallest combined arms units that can be committed independently. Their function is to finish decisively by closing with and destroying enemy forces through integrated fire and maneuver, and tactical assault. For continued developmental purposes, the core of the UA brigade is the combined arms combat battalion that commands a number of organic *small tactical units*, which fight as teams of fighting teams. The span of control of the UA brigade is four to six battalions. Maneuver UAs require the qualities of durability, endurance, and stamina. Brigades are expected to employ most combat battalions in dispersed yet integrated engagements, while periodically cycling individual units into and out of contact to sustain operational momentum. Combat battalions must dominate the unexpected contact and be able to transition through several engagements in sequence.

d. Objective Force UAs initiate operations using all military and interagency means to gain information superiority and fully understand the terrain, weather, enemy, and friendly forces; and turn that knowledge to advantage. The force attains organic, higher level Army, joint, and coalition effects to set conditions to enter battle on our terms, seize the initiative before contact, and employ our strengths against enemy weaknesses. Units of Action close with and destroy the enemy, synchronizing reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition (RSTA), fires, maneuver, and assault, to dominate in a dynamic battle of action-reaction-counteraction. This presents the enemy with multiple dilemmas, causing them to act ineffectively, and enabling UAs to gain lethal overmatch

to disintegrate, dislocate, and destroy enemy forces; finishing them decisively at a time and place of our choosing. Units of Action then rapidly transition to the next engagement or operations, across the full spectrum of conflict.

2-3. Analytical underpinnings/operational environment.

a. The analytical underpinnings (fig 2-1) for this concept date back to the experiences of AirLand Battle and the Army of Excellence; the Louisiana Maneuvers of the early 1990s and Force XXI; Army Warfighting and Mobile Strike Force Experiments; Combat Training Center, and Center for Army Lessons Learned observations; Army lessons learned from operational deployments; and Army After Next and Strike Force studies.

b. Concept foundations include sustained analysis of the evolving operational environment and conclusions drawn from advanced concept technology demonstrations. It has come together at this time in response to the **Army Vision** articulated by the Secretary of the Army and Army Chief of Staff, through the results of Army Transformation Wargames, Objective Force Analyses, and TRADOC Seminar Wargames. Interim Brigade Combat Team and Interim Division experiments and joint experimentation also inform the concept. The concept responds to Army tactical

responsibilities incurred under Joint Vision 2020 and the conclusions of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review.

c. Revolutionary concepts for future tactical combat must evolve in response to changes in anticipated threats, possible operational environments, as well as future advanced technologies. Even without the latter, the former would demand our adjustment. The current force was designed, equipped and trained to confront an enemy that conducted highly centralized military operations, gained momentum through echelonment in maneuver and fires in recognizable formations and groupings of high payoff and most dangerous targets, with a fires-based doctrine of combined arms. Analysts could easily recognize the whole from parts of their array. Red strengths were in RSTA, momentum from massed fires and maneuver to penetrate, and operational mobility to exploit.

d. To respond to this threat, the Army adopted a framework of operational depth and a pattern of operations that called for movement by echelon in the following approach and sequence of combat operations:

- Develop the situation from external sources.
- Establish contact.
- Deploy to develop the situation after contact.




Figure 2-1. Analytical underpinnings

- Maneuver to fix.
- Disrupt.
- Destroy the enemy through envelopment and follow through action.

Key enablers were Army and joint intelligence feeds, Army and joint deep fires orchestrated by higher echelons to set conditions for tactical success, and often, close support of ground maneuver by Army or joint aviation. Time was lost in transition, and it proved difficult to seize and retain initiative or maintain operational momentum. Getting combat information, fires, or mobility support to units in contact was often time-consuming and difficult. Tactical units normally relied on developing the situation after contact for useful combat information, and units were often attrited in the process. Our large, ponderous formations precluded freedom of action; overwatch and suppression were limited primarily to line of sight (LOS) acquisition and fires.

e. It was difficult to keep reconnaissance and surveillance, maneuver, and fires synchronized. Setting conditions on behalf of committed tactical units was very difficult. The Army trained as systems, but fought system of systems. Light forces were strategically mobile but lacked C4ISR, lethality, survivability, tactical mobility, and staying

power. Heavy forces were survivable and lethal but lacked tactical mobility in many austere infrastructures, and operational agility was encumbered by a heavy logistics 'tail'. Pure forces had to be tailored horizontally into a single task force that combined light and heavy forces, capable of situational mission sets and conditions, but imposing an 'alert, train, and deploy' paradigm. Differences in protection and mobility regimes inhibited harmonious integration.

f. Objective Force tactical units are confronted with a rapidly changing and variable operational environment. They must be able to fight increasingly sophisticated opponents, enabled by technology, exploiting all terrain sets and weather conditions. While the enemy still retains the ability to fight in massed formations, they can no longer be depended upon only to array themselves in predictable patterns. The threat will understand their battlespace and seek to deny the same understanding to us. They will seek advantages of weather, terrain, and light conditions; take sanctuary in complex terrain and employ terrain masking; and protect their high payoff targets by shielding these amongst noncombatants. They will conduct dispersed, nonlinear attacks and defense, and mass under favorable conditions to attack lucrative high-payoff targets or exploit temporary friendly imbalances. (See fig 2-2.)




Figure 2-2. The tactical threat – COE and beyond

g. Because of the proliferation of state-of-the-art conventional weapons and other advanced technologies, the future tactical problem must be expected to include combinations of conventional and unconventional capabilities, deployed asymmetrically with adaptive tactics. The enemy will achieve greater lethality in the close fight and an ability to kill at tactical stand off. They will employ precision networked fires at greater ranges from dispersed delivery systems.

h. The enemy will be capable of using chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, and other weapons of mass effects. They will leverage terrain by using natural and manmade obstacles, terrain compartments and population centers—further complicated with mines and booby traps—to deny us freedom of movement. They will protect themselves from targeting using cover and concealment, and deception and terrain masking; all enhanced by an integrated and offensive air and missile defense system.

i. Simple and effective intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance means will allow the enemy to leverage advanced technologies, developed by others, with a focus on their force effectiveness rather than a competitive system overmatch with us. Irregular forces will be employed to achieve military effects throughout the battle area and the enemy can be expected to focus operationally on endurance more than decision. By virtue of their superior knowledge of the terrain and operational area, as well as a focus on achieving what to them are only limited objectives, the enemy will often be spared the pressure to act. They can wait out our formations for times advantageous to them. Therefore, there is a need to find and kill them at the time and place of our choosing to impose our will.

j. The challenges these threat capabilities present the Army first affect how we see the enemy—both the parts and the whole. Gaining situational understanding and anticipating enemy intentions in light of the complexities of this operational environment is much more challenging. Second is the reality that lethality and survivability overmatch will not be ensured by platform technologies alone. Achieving the necessary degree of mutual support to execute fire and maneuver, and finishing the assault decisively against capabilities-based threats, remains problematic for current forces. In short, we are going to have to change how we do business because enemy capabilities and their entire mode of operation are going to change so dramatically.

Chapter 3 Concept

3-1. Units of Action tactics.

a. Objective Force tactical units will be required to win on the offensive, initiate combat on their terms, gain and retain the initiative, build momentum quickly, and win decisively. They must be masters of transition. Although necessarily optimized for offensive operations in major theater war, the Objective Force must be equally effective at every point on the spectrum of operations, able to execute missions from offense, defense, to stability and support operations across the full spectrum of conflict. They must be as comfortable and competent, in homeland security operations, as they are in combat operations overseas.

b. A major goal of the Objective Force is to go well beyond the inherent strengths of existing heavy and light forces, recognizing that evolving technical and geostrategic conditions require dramatically new responses. We must retain strengths of quality leaders and soldiers; reliable sustainment; heavy force speed, firepower, and combined arms character and survivability; in combination with light force versatility, deployability, and skill, in dismounted close combat—all within a single force design and common mobility regime. Current DTLOMS solutions simply do not suffice.

Objective Force operations will be characterized by developing situations out of contact; maneuvering to positions of advantage; engaging enemy forces beyond the range of their weapons; destroying them with precision fires and, when necessary, by tactical assault at times and places of our choosing. Commanders will accomplish this by maneuvering dispersed tactical formations of Future Combat Systems units linked together by robust C4ISR capabilities for common situational dominance.

Chief of Staff White Paper
Concept for the Objective Force
Concept Summary

3-2. Quality of Firsts.

a. Objective Force Maneuver UA brigades and battalions are enabled by a “Quality of Firsts”—**see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively**.

(1) Objective Force units will **see first** by detecting, identifying and tracking the individual components of enemy units. Advanced technologies that lead to unprecedented intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, coupled with other ground, air, and space sensors, are networked to provide a common integrated operational picture that will enable us to see the enemy, both in whole and in part, as a complex, adaptive organization.

(a) This common operational picture (COP) must provide an unprecedented opportunity to understand what the enemy is doing, and better anticipate their intentions. Objective Force commanders are able to leverage the intellect, experience, and tactical intuition of leaders, at multiple levels, in order to identify enemy decisive points and conceptualize solutions—thus creating a collective genius through accelerated, collaborative planning.

(b) As commanders decide on a course of action, they immediately disseminate their intent to all levels, affording maximum time for subordinate commands to conduct requisite troop leading procedures. The time gained through effective use of these information technologies, and rapid decisionmaking, enables Objective Force units to seize and retain the initiative, and build momentum for decisive outcomes.

(2) Able to **see first and understand first** with combat information on terrain and weather, Red and Blue forces and noncombatants tailored to unit task and purpose, the UA will develop the situation, out of contact, and establish a dynamic tactical information sphere in order to determine when and where to fight on favorable terms. The UA will also set conditions (isolate and shape) for one or more engagements, and maneuver rapidly on separate axes to positions of advantage, from which tactical units can move quickly to envelop, *without the need* first to fix the engaged enemy force.

(3) The combat battalion **acts first**, initiating decisive combat at its chosen time and place. Wide dissemination of mission-type orders that enable decentralized operations within the commander’s intent, coupled with broad access to the COP, provide unprecedented opportunities for subordinate initiative to exploit enemy vulnerabilities as openings present themselves. Battalions continue to develop the situation after contact, integrate maneuver and fires at stand off, and create tactical overmatch. To *act first*, leaders,

systems, and units must have information dominance and be capable of moving, shooting, and reengaging faster than the enemy, with assured first round kill potential.

(4) Small units and subordinate teams of teams **finish decisively** by well-timed tactical assaults, then transition rapidly to exploitation or the next engagement without allowing the enemy time or opportunity to regroup or continue the fight. All this must be done against an enemy who will know our capabilities and be imaginative and adaptable in seeking to counter every action we take. Application will be neither easy nor according to formula.

b. Ultimately, all Objective Force decisive operations are based on tactical success in close combat, the capability to seize and control key terrain, and to close with and destroy enemy forces. In this sense, close combat actions are the fundamental building blocks for operational success and strategic victory. Units of Actions execute decisive combat operations by denying the enemy freedom of action and defeating them in detail through a series of rapid, violent actions.

c. Future engagements will be characterized by new tactical principles based on development of the situation in and out of contact, and the balanced combination of stand off fires, skillful maneuver, and tactical assault to achieve simultaneous decisions at multiple purpose-based locations. Units of Action direct the continuous integration of powerful small tactical units, moving along multiple, noncontiguous axes to objective areas, while engaging the adversary with organic, overmatching, and precise supporting fires. The engagement culminates in enemy capitulation or tactical assault to destroy enemy forces in detail. Enduring functions and essential changes in the operating echelons enable a discussion of the tactical actions *before contact, during contact, and in the tactical assault*.

3-3. Units of Action employment techniques.

a. **Before Contact.** Units of action must **develop the situation out of contact, decide when and where to fight, set conditions** to ensure tactical success, **and maneuver to a position of advantage**. (See fig 3-1.) Combined efforts, by all echelons, endure before contact to:

- Degrade threat C4ISR;
- Leverage higher headquarters intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB);
- Shape the battlefield with maneuver, fires, or obstacles in depth;
- Fuse RSTA information into a COP tailored to unit task and purpose;




Figure 3-1. Actions before contact

- Employ manned and unmanned air, ground, and space-based reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S);

- Neutralize long-range, non-line of sight (NLOS) fires,

- Tactically tailor or retask for each mission.

(1) Networked RSTA—manned and unmanned air and ground RSTA, and remotely delivered sensors—organic at all UA echelons, linked to all shooters, is what changes. Timely, usable external information, including accurate information about terrain and weather, is disseminated for use. Soldiers and leaders will be empowered with accurate information about terrain and weather; and will receive accurate, timely, up-to-date digital map information of the battlefield. Units will be able to go on mission, receive and disseminate terrain and weather information immediately throughout the area of responsibility, even while en route, to gain the 'home court advantage' at all times. Obstacle and booby trap detection, and neutralization at stand off, enhance tactical mobility and operational momentum, in all kinds of complex and urban terrain. Units maintain overwatch on the move and at stand off ranges, achieving a higher degree of mutual support

between tactical units. Commanders practice a continuous, focused IPB and estimate process. The result is increased freedom of action, preserved longer, and a greater ability to cause the enemy to see and understand last, or wrongly.

(2) The brigade assigns missions, shapes actions beyond and between battalion engagements, integrates external intelligence, organic RSTA and long-range fires, fills in gaps in combat battalion capabilities, and sets conditions for tactical success. A tactical infosphere (layered, integrated network of information and communications capabilities) enables overlapping information activities to push actionable combat information from satellite and national sensors, unmanned aerial vehicles, and other means in theater, onto a highly efficient shared digital network. This network must support prompt combat action, rapid decisionmaking, or further analysis by tactical units.

(3) Participating in the common network, brigade and battalions meet their own more discrete and focused information requirements with organic RSTA (the results of which they add to the network). Quality and quantity of information provided by the *infosphere* will increase during combat operations, both as additional 'eyes' are

added to the RSTA process, and as the enemy is forced to respond to various modes of attack. Commanders direct purpose-based outcomes through mission orders, maneuver units over wider areas to exploit the use of terrain to advantage, and bypass least dangerous enemy positions and obstacles when possible to achieve positions of advantage for delivery of fires or executing assaults. The brigade and battalions must have the ability to continue developing the situation after contact. They must have a *countersurprise* quality and the ability to maintain freedom of action and disengage, if desired.

(4) While the *infosphere* builds, the combat battalion commander, using a cycle of rapid decisionmaking more like troop leading procedures (FM 7-8) than the military decisionmaking process (FM 101-5), organizes his small fighting units while on the move and builds his plan collaboratively with the brigade commander. The brigade commander will isolate and shape the battlefield, physically with maneuver, fires, and obstacles, and informationally by denying the enemy observation. Manned and unmanned aerial platforms add a lethal third-dimensional sensor and shooter capability. The battalion maneuvers into position, often directly from a previous engagement, and rapidly receives or builds the necessary situational understanding to execute precision maneuver and decisive combat.

b. **Actions during Contact.** (See fig 3-2.)
Units of Action **initiate decisive combat at the time and place of choosing.** They continue to

develop the situation in contact and integrate maneuver, fires, RSTA, and the network.

Forms of maneuver, tactical formations and movement techniques endure but tactics, techniques, and procedures for implementing them will change. Units perform R&S to bypass and breach obstacles in-stride at weakest points. Suppression and obscuration still set conditions for protecting assault forces.

(1) Many actions during contact change. The inherent combined arms structure of the maneuver UA enables decisive full-spectrum operations in any terrain and in all weather, using organic fires in support of all combinations of mounted and dismounted engagement. Maneuver changes in terms of depth, time, and space.

(2) Tactical movement, enabled by improved situational understanding, reduces chance contact. Responsiveness and extended ranges of weapon systems enable far superior mutual support between decentralized, dispersed tactical units. The brigade can combine tactical maneuver with commitment of air-assault capable subordinate units to achieve decisive combinations.

(3) Networked units with high situational understanding integrate precision fires and maneuver to set favorable conditions for tactical assaults. Units now provide overwatch, at stand off ranges, to better support maneuver and assaults, which again, facilitates increased freedom of action. Small unit leaders employ more types of weapons, and operate over greater distances with greater




Figure 3-2. Actions during contact

dispersion, to achieve assured, on-demand, over-matching fires.

c. **After Contact.** Both brigade and battalion **continue to develop the situation.** The brigade commander **focuses on attacking high payoff targets** (identified by understanding the enemy pattern of operations)—those that can change the correlation of forces or battlefield geometry at a single blow, and thus **create opportunity.** This enables subordinate commanders to go after their respective most-dangerous targets to mitigate operational risk. With full freedom of action, empowered by networked situational understanding, the battalion is able to choose the time and location for the close fight. Small units and battalions apply fire control and distribution to precision LOS, beyond line of sight (BLOS) and NLOS fires on enemy targets. An advanced fire control and distribution means sorts out high-payoff and most dangerous targets rapidly in-depth amongst the vast array of threat intelligence. Aerial platforms also add an accurate and immediate third-dimensional sensor and shooter capability to the building fight.

(1) While making, maintaining, breaking, and reestablishing contact, the UA continually improves its knowledge of the terrain, enemy, and friendly situation. Layered sensors at all levels reveal high payoff and most dangerous targets. The UA denies the enemy the ability to see and understand by stripping away their sensors and obscuring their vision, thus presenting them with multiple unanticipated simultaneous dilemmas.

(2) Units of Action seek stand off in sensing and in LOS, BLOS, and NLOS fires. Leaders will continuously seek that “middle ground” between being too far from the enemy to support the assault with stand off fires, and so close as to become vulnerable to their direct fire systems. Mutual support between small units and from external sources underpins dispersed small unit tactics and facilitates engagements at stand off. Seeing and understanding battle damage assessment (BDA) is critical during the engagement as leaders must quickly transition to subsequent actions and the assault while maintaining relentless pressure. Additionally, effective BDA ensures efficient expenditure of limited munitions—thereby reducing requirements for increased levels of supply and associated transport.

d. **Tactical Assault.** Small units fighting teams of teams **finish the enemy decisively through assault; supported by high situational understanding, and assured over-match in lethality and survivability**—then the battalion **transitions to the next engagement.** Enduring Army Values and the quality of small unit leadership are key to the successful tactical assault. Dispersed, decentralized yet integrated operations, based on mission orders, small unit battle drills, and individual initiative are essential, as is the continuing necessity to isolate and suppress the objective. (See fig 3-3.)

(1) There are significant changes in the tactical assault. Future enemy disposition on objectives is dispersed, employing cover and concealment,




Figure 3-3. Tactical assault

decoys and disinformation. The enemy will mask valuable assets by terrain and amongst noncombatants, conduct limited raids or counterattack from this set, achieving mass by integrated combined arms effects and advanced technologies in C4ISR, BLOS and long-range precision fires. *Future assaults by UAs will be performed with the agility and tempo of hasty attacks while demonstrating the precision of deliberate attacks in terms of striking at the right time and place.* High fidelity, discrete combat information (terrain, weather, Red, Blue and noncombatant) is needed to support small unit task and purpose and to synchronize assaults into a decisive endstate.

(2) Critical threshold information must:

- Enable an assaulting force to attack at weakness.
- Allow the force to discern and attack critical or decisive points while bypassing unnecessary action.
- Bypass or reduce final protective obstacles in-stride.
- See and counter enemy reactions to our assault.
- Discern and strike most dangerous targets.
- Confirm BDA.
- Perform superior combat identification of friend and foe.

RSTA is not just about sight—it must include a capability to see protected enemy elements by seeing through walls and thick foliage, and peeking into buildings, caves, or subterranean infrastructure.

(3) The Maneuver UA finishes the enemy decisively through fire, maneuver, and tactical assault. This does not mean halting operational momentum to gain situational awareness, prepping the objective with indirect fires, then assaulting. Rather, units fully synchronize RSTA, fires, and dismounted and mounted maneuver from the time contact is made throughout the assault—all done on the move. Lethal overmatch in LOS, NLOS, and BLOS assaulting fires is gained by advanced fire control and distribution in time and space over the objective area. Networked fires allow leaders of small units and teams of teams to solve the challenges of fire control and distribution by discerning most dangerous targets, often while moving, and direct the most appropriate fires to destroy them.

(4) Lethal, rapid gunfire capability is critical in LOS engagements, to develop the situation in contact, fire and maneuver, and during the assault. Units mass effects of all weapon systems by combining LOS, NLOS, and BLOS fires in overwatch and

mutual support while on the move, achieving simultaneity of support-by-fire and assault tasks. Lethal and nonlethal fires are applied using quality target location and precise attack methods/munitions, as well as area fires to obscure and suppress. Loitering attack munitions, and unmanned and manned air and ground vehicles, sense targets before attack, and provide BDA after attack.

(5) Lethality and survivability are both gained by first-round assured kill, immediate avenge kill of enemy keyhole systems in a new counterfire capacity to silence ‘would be’ firers, reduced system and unit signature, and active protective systems. Units employ obscuration to blind the enemy and ensure we can *see and act first*. Obstacles and booby traps are detected and neutralized at stand off, and bypassed or reduced in-stride to not surrender operational momentum.

(6) Small unit maneuver either dislocates enemy elements or they are destroyed while safeguarding freedom of action and decisionmaking—enabling, not restricting initiative of small unit leaders and soldiers. Battalions finish engagements with coherent combat power and, under the direction of their commanders, transition quickly in response to subsequent missions without significant pause.

3-4. Units of Action design principles. The Maneuver UA concept is based on meeting a set of required operational capabilities that respond to the system *design principles* of **responsiveness, deployability, agility, versatility, lethality, survivability, and sustainability** foreseen in the Army Vision. An additional essential principle is **trainability**. Trainability is necessary to ensure soldiers and leaders are prepared to employ the Maneuver UA and achieve its full combat potential of full-spectrum dominance. The tactical acumen of small unit leaders must be honed in operational art and science, and doctrine. Future training models must be task-oriented on mission, but also make sense out of the variables in the operational environment, in order to provide experiences that really develop skills and attributes at full spectrum.

a. **Responsiveness** has the quality of time, distance, and sustained momentum. For American land forces to be successful, adversaries must be prevented from achieving their aims; and national command authority/Commander in Chief objectives are all achieved.

b. **Deployability.** To be truly responsive, Army Forces must be **deployable** and capable of quickly and rapidly concentrating combat power in an operational area. For *responsiveness and deployability*, maneuver UA must be capable of en route mission planning and rehearsal, exercise of

battle command, synchronization of combined arms, and integration into gaining theater command during movement by air, land, and sea.

(1) They must be able to fight immediately upon arrival in all regimes of terrain, weather, and season. Units of Action must be immediately capable of conducting distributed and continuous combined arms full-spectrum operations, day and night, in open, close, and complex terrain, throughout the battlespace, without undergoing reception and staging.

(2) The Army Vision has set the Army goal of deploying a brigade combat team anywhere in the world in 96 hours after liftoff.

(3) The Objective Force goal is for the UA to organically self-sustain itself for up to three days of high-tempo operations without replenishment from external sources. This will require enhanced system capabilities.

(4) Units of Action must be unburdened of significant deployment and sustainment tonnage, and must be deployable by a variety of lift platforms to include C130 profile aircraft and advanced vertical and horizontal lift, such as the Air Maneuver and Transport, or Theater Support Vessel.

(5) Systems must be provided with embedded joint in-transit visibility systems lash-up for movement planning and tracking.

c. **Agility** is tied to initiative and speed and has both physical and mental components. Agile formations make transitions quickly between changes in task, purpose, and direction, maneuvering into and out of contact—without sapping operational momentum. They can do this because of superior mobility and the ability to adapt faster than the enemy, thereby denying them the initiative.

(1) The Army will develop young tactical leaders that are schooled in operational art, science, and doctrine, and are masters at troop leading in dynamic operational environments.

(2) Future leaders must be able to develop mission-type orders that empower decentralized small unit initiative, perform battle command of decisive combat operations, and negotiate and leverage available resources and opportunities effectively in missions requiring this tactical acumen.

(3) The C4ISR architecture must be optimized for battle command on the move with running IPB and estimate of situation, visualization by shared integrated COP, and dissemination of tactical schemes by combined arms mission orders with graphic overlays.

(4) Changes in leadership during battle will be automatically disseminated to appropriate levels with shared COP to enable continuity of operations. Units must be capable of en route task organization.

(5) Systems must be capable of supporting decisive maneuver, horizontal and vertical, day and night, in all terrain and weather, as a mounted or dismounted combined arms team, without compromising tactical unit integrity and operational momentum.

(6) All organic systems must be capable of the same level of high cross-country mobility. Agility will also require access to a wide variety of support, without having to include a multitude of elements organically in the unit, thereby overburdening agility by sheer size.

d. **Versatility** describes the inherent capacity of the UA formation to conduct decisive maneuver, horizontal and vertical, day and night, in all terrain and weather conditions, synchronized with Army and joint fires and RSTA in order to dominate at any point on the spectrum of operations.

(1) Formations can adapt to changes of mission with minimal adjustment. Units of Action provide unsurpassed mobility over operational distances as an integrated combined arms unit.

(2) Objective Force units will be equipped and trained for effectiveness in any of the missions the Army has been asked to perform. Versatility will require personnel to be trained to respond to unfamiliar scenarios. It will require units to be full-spectrum capable, optimized for offensive operations, structured to initiate combat on our terms—at time and place and with a method of our choosing.

(3) Units of Action must be capable of accepting objective, legacy and interim system tailoring. The UA is designed to perform combined arms maneuver of combat tactical units to execute:

(a) Dismounted operations enabled by mounted forces.

(b) Mounted operations enabled by dismounted forces.

(c) On occasion, pure dismounted operations.

(d) On occasion, pure mounted operations.

e. **Lethality.** Enhanced lethality will allow Army Forces to destroy any opponent quickly, with shattering effect. The elements of lethal combat power remain fires, maneuver, leadership, protection, and information.

(1) The Objective Force UA will have the capability to destroy enemy formations at longer ranges, with smaller caliber, greater precision, and more devastating target effects. Key enablers include organic LOS, BLOS, and NLOS fires that are Army and joint. These fires will overmatch the enemy in all conditions and environments, and based on one shot—one or more kill disciplines and designs. Rapid gunfire capability, optimized for kinetic energy (KE) overmatch, will be essential for close combat. New propellants and materials will permit smaller caliber penetrators, together with increased accuracy, thereby reducing ammunition weight and opening new possibilities for system as well as unit agility.

(2) Future Combat System (FCS) sensor-to-shooter linkage enables the decision to engage in seconds, using automated, semiautomated, or manual fire control, and distribution and clearance procedures; and provides target identification to reduce latency in providing effects. It will also be a by-product of the Quality of Firsts, the confident actions of soldiers and leaders empowered by mission orders to act on their own initiative; able to identify the most dangerous threats, and make decisions on the move.

(3) Finally, it will also follow more rapid action born of superior training.

f. **Survivability** is the ability to combine systems, tactics, operations, and processes that afford optimum protection to deployed Army Forces. Operational tempo, Quality of Firsts, overmatching lethality, and a combination of operational protection measures are essential characteristics for enhancing force survivability.

(1) Ground and air systems will employ the best combinations of active and passive protection systems to enhance survivability against KE, and current and projected enemy lethal effects. This includes low observability, ballistic protection, long-range acquisition and targeting, early attack, and assured first-round hit-and-kill technologies to ensure the required degrees of survivability.

(2) Future Combat System integrates into cooperative direct counter fire systems to 'avenge' kill enemy systems that are engaging or preparing to engage friendly systems from keyhole positions. The Objective Force will take advantage of technologies that provide maximum protection at the individual soldier level, whether the soldier is on a platform or on the ground.

(3) Survivability is approached holistically, achieved by force design, situational awareness, and collective training. The Quality of Firsts, no-risk adverse advanced antifratricide measures, and the provision of medical support to lowest tactical

levels enables it.

(4) The agility of UA formations, combined with the COP, is critical to maximize survivability.

(5) Objective Force survivability is also linked to its inherently offensive orientation. By seizing the initiative and seeing, and understanding and acting first, the UA will enhance its own survivability through action and its retention of the initiative.

g. **Sustainability** in a full spectrum Army requires a sustainability concept that allows the UA to maintain combat power with dramatically reduced stockpiles in theater, while relying on technology to provide reach back access to supplies, sustained velocity management, and real-time tracking of supplies and equipment.

(1) Sustainability will be improved by a concept of pulsed, as opposed to continuous, logistics to meet reduced requirements. Units of Action will be self-sustaining for three days of high operational tempo operations without replenishment from external sources.

(2) Sustainment effectiveness and efficiency are provided by:

- Innovative, multimodal distribution concepts.
- Ultrareliable and redundant components that remain operationally effective with minimal pulsed service.
- Commonality in system, subsystem, and component across formations in platforms and components.
- New forms of power generation and high fuel efficiency.
- Simplified systems maintainability that greatly reduces maintenance and replenishment requirements.

(3) Revolutionary means of transporting and sustaining people and material to leverage new ground and aerial concepts of delivery and dynamic rerouting and tracking of supply delivery as priorities dictate, will match higher operating tempos with equally responsive sustainment tempos.

h. **Trainability.** Every day in the Army, we do two things—train soldiers, and grow them into leaders. Training to high standards is essential for a full spectrum force; Army Forces must train to, and maintain, the highest readiness levels.

(1) Battle-focused training on combat tasks prepares soldiers, units, and leaders to deploy, fight, and win. Objective Force leaders must be capable of training their units without significant

external support packages, and will need to be innovative, creative, risk takers in both training and warfighting.

(2) Embedding training support packages into the UA organizational and system designs will enhance readiness. Training support packages will facilitate acquisition, maintenance, and sustainment of warfighter skills. Training on UA equipment will be enhanced with a common set of operational and user interfaces that look, feel, and function in similar fashion.

(3) Usability engineering, to create systems that are easy to learn; user friendly; preclude catastrophic mistakes; and facilitate operational competence; must be systematically incorporated into the developmental process.

3-5. Conclusion.

a. The battlefield remains a brutal, deadly, and frightening environment, and the effects of direct combat are still fear, uncertainty, and the fog and friction of war. It still requires personal courage and discipline to enter and prevail. The combat edge of the Objective Force will continue to be based on superior leadership, training, and skilled combat soldiers imbued with the warrior ethos. All soldiers must be developed first as warriors, with a common baseline of values, field craft, discipline,

mental agility, and the ability to employ the emerging future combat systems. The human dimension of combat endures, along with the biological requirements for periodic relief from immediate fear and stress; and sleep, food, and water. Another requirement is the underlying health and fitness that enables soldiers to stretch their abilities, to endure hardship as a natural consequence of service, and remain adaptive thinkers and actors, even under the stress of battle. The social underpinnings of collective action, trust, cohesion, camaraderie, and ethics, remain essential, as do the military factors of training, leadership, teamwork, and character. Battles will still continue to be decided by the direct leadership in fighting teams acting, contributing, and influencing the outcome of the engagements. (See fig 3-4.)

b. This UA concept is now of sufficient scope and quality to support development of requirements documentation to focus the science and technology community, and training and material developer efforts. The concept is a work in progress to be refined during development of the UA Operational and Organizational Plan. The UA Operational and Organizational Plan will:

- Provide a basis to inform the Army leadership, the joint community, and Congress on the direction of the Objective Force Tactical Concept;




Figure 3-4. Enduring human dimension of close combat

- Provide an initial tactical basis for Army and joint modeling, analysis, and experimentation and a basis of analysis by Battle Labs, combat and training developers;

- Focus research and development efforts in the science and technology community.

c. The Maneuver UA tactical concept portrays how Objective Force soldiers, organized in teams of fighting teams, will enter the fight at the right time and place, and maneuver to the point of decision against a capable adaptive enemy who fights with cunning and determination. It also describes how those soldiers will recognize the circumstances and opportunities presented; turn them to their advantage in a dynamic battle, and then finish this thinking enemy through decisive combat.

Appendix A References

Joint Vision 2020, April 2002 (Available on the Defense Technical Information Center website: <http://www.dtic.mil/jv2020/jvpub2.htm>)

Army Vision (Available on the following website: <http://www.army.mil/vision/The%20Army%20Vision.PDF>)

Glossary

Section I Abbreviations

BDA	battle damage assessment
BLOS	beyond line of sight
C4ISR	command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
COP	common operational picture
DOTMLPF	doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
KE	kinetic energy
LOS	line of sight
NLOS	non-line of sight
R&S	reconnaissance and surveillance
RSTA	reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition
UA	Unit of Action

Section II Terms

Quality of Firsts

Objective Force Maneuver Unit of Action brigades and battalions are enabled by a “Quality of Firsts”—see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively.

See First

Units of Action will possess the capability to see first by detecting, identifying, and tracking the individual components of enemy units.

Act First

The combat battalion acts first, initiating decisive combat at its chosen time and place. Wide dissemination of mission-type orders that enable decentralized operations within the commander’s intent coupled with broad access to the COP provide unprecedented opportunities for subordinate initiative to exploit enemy vulnerabilities as openings present themselves. To act first, leaders, systems, and units must have information dominance and be capable of moving, shooting, and reengaging faster than the enemy with assured first round kill potential.

Understand First

Understand first with combat information on terrain and weather, the UA will develop the situation out of contact, and establish a dynamic tactical information sphere in order to determine when and where to fight on favorable terms, set conditions (isolate and shape) for one or more engagements, and maneuver rapidly on separate axes to positions of advantage, from which tactical units can move quickly to envelop without the need first to fix the engaged enemy force.

Finish Decisively

Small units and subordinate teams of teams finish decisively by well-timed tactical assaults, then transition rapidly to exploitation or the next engagement without allowing the enemy time or opportunity to regroup or continue the fight. All this must be done against an enemy who will know our capabilities and be imaginative and adaptable in seeking to counter every action we take. Application will be neither easy nor according to formula.

Units of Action

Units of Action are the tactical warfighting echelons of the Objective Force. Units of Action comprise those echelons brigade and below. Maneuver UA are the smallest combined arms units that can be committed independently. Their function is to finish decisively by closing with and destroying enemy forces through integrated fire and maneuver, and tactical assault.

Units of Employment

Units of Employment perform tasks assigned today to divisions and higher service headquarters. They link ground and joint forces and orchestrate ground operations that decide joint campaigns. They also have the capacity to assume command of Joint Task Forces. Units of Employment are the basis of combined arms air-ground task forces. They resource and execute combat operations; designate objectives; coordinate with multiservice, inter-agency, multinational, and nongovernmental activities; and employ long range fires, aviation, and sustainment; while providing C4ISR and tactical direction to UAs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

LARRY R. JORDAN
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Deputy Commanding General/
Chief of Staff

//signed//
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